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ALLEN M. STEARNE t
The fiction which is the subject of this article is bar sinister to any
"book of the month" list, and far removed from the interest and charm
of an Arthur Train story. It relates solely to Legal Fiction in its strict.
technical sense.
Contemplating the symbolic blindfolded figure of Justice, it would
appear singularly incongruous that such an apparently questionable instru-
mentality as a legal fiction should be sanctioned and employed in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice. The very definition of the term
is startling. According to the accepted definition a fiction of law assumes
as true that which is either false or at leat is as probably false as trte. At
the outset a fiction is not to be confused *ith a presumption. A presump-
tion arises from the matured experience of man, -and therefore possesses
some basis of truth. Contradistinguished from fictions, some presumptions
may be rebutted, while others, upon the ground- of public polity, may not
be. traversed. For example, by statute, after six years, a debt is presumed
to have been satisfied. -This presumption falls away upon proof of the
debtor's acknowledgment and promise to pay within such period. However,
a minor is presumed to be incompetent, and no amount of proof as to his
acumen, capacity or understanding may overcome the presumption of in-
capacity-
In modern times, with more flexible legislative facilities available, legal
fictions are met with far less frequency than in the past. Yet it must not
be supposed that fictions are wholly relegated to the interest of antiquarians.
As late as the present year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court I considered
the application of a legal fiction as it affected state inheritance tax laws.
t-LL.B. i9o5, University of Pennsylvania; Judge of the Orphans' Court, Philadelphia
County; author of various articles on. Orphans' Court practice.
"Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (931).
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Curiously enough neither the Supreme Court justices nor the judges in
the Orphans' Court2 were unanimous. Despite Mr. Brewster's statement
in his book on Practice 3 that "a fiction is absurd and puerile, the history
of which is not worthy to trace", it may prove of interest, and perhaps in-
structive, to saunter through a portion of the still partially verdurous field
of legal fictions. With lingering fragments of memory concerning ancient
and modern history, we smile as we read: Rex non potest fallere nec falli.
We question that a king cannot deceive or be deceived. A protest arises
against the unrebuttable fiction: Rex non potest peccare, as we are persuaded
that under varying circumstances it is quite possible that even a king may
do wrong.
Lay writers have struck at ludicrous legal fictions. Charles Dickens
takes a mild fling in Nicholas Nickleby, where he describes the "Rules" of
the King's Bench Prison. The "Rules" constituted certain liberty accorded
debtors imprisoned for debt, which enabled the "affluent" to reside adjoin-
ing the prison, whereas, the impecunious debtors were imprisoned and did
not secure the comforts provided for the most despicable felon. Writes
Dickens:
"There are many pleasant fictions of the law in constant operation,
but there is not one so pleasant or practically humourous as that which
supposes every man to be of equal value in its impartial eye, and the
benefits of all laws to be equally attainable by all men, without the
smallest reference to the furniture of their pockets."
Sanuel Warren, in his legal classic Ten Thousand a Year describes
very accurately the English procedure in an action in ejectment wherein a
legal fiction plays a prominent role. The vehicle is the celebrated case of
Doe on the demise of Titmouse v. Jolter. He writes: 4
""If Jones claims a debt or goods, or gamades from Smith, one
would think that, if he went to law, the action would be entitled 'Jones
versus Smith'; and so it is. But behold, if it be land which is claimed
by Jones from Smith, the style and name of the cause stand thus:-
'DOE, on the demise of Jones, versus ROE.' Instead, therefore, of
Jones and Smith fighting out the matter in their own proper names,
they set up a couple of puppets, (called 'John Doe' and 'Richard Roe')
who fall upon one another in a very quaint fashion, after the manner
of Punch and Judy. John Doe pretends to be the real plaintiff, and
Richard Roe the real defendant. John Doe says that the land which
Richard Roe has is his, (the said John Doe's) because Jones (the real
plaintiff) gave him a lease on it; and Jones is then called 'the lessor
of the plaintiff.' John Doe further says that one Richard Roe, (who
calls himself by the very significant and expressive name of a 'Casual
2Id. 14 D. & C. 251 (Pa. 1928).
'BREWSTER, PRACTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed., I896).
4 WARREN, TEN THOUSAND A YEAR (854) I89.
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Ejector,') came and turned him out, and so John Doe brings his action
against Richard Roe. 'Tis a fact that whenever land is sought to be
recoyered in England, this anomalous and farcical proceeding must
be adopted. It is the duty of the real plaintiff (Jones) to serve on
the real defendant (Smith) a copy of the queer document.
Not so many years ago a fiction in Pennsylvania was employed to test
the validity of a will. It was a "feigned issue", based upon a sheer fiction.
Thus, if A's will was questioned, and an issue was awarded by the Orphans'
Court to the Court of Common Pleas, the suit was in assumpsit. The
assumpsit sued upon was a mere piece of imagination. No promise was
ever actually made. Plaintiff declared that a conversation had occurred
between him and the defendant wherein plaintiff stated that a certain paper
writing was the will of A while defendant denied such assertion. Plaintiff
then averred that thereupon defendant promised to pay plaintiff $IOO if
the writing was the will of A; that it is the will of A, and defendant there-
fore owes plaintiff $IOO on this promise to pay; that although requested
defendant has not paid, wherefore he brings suit. Defendant in his answer
or plea admits the conversation and the promise but denies he owes the
money because it is not the will of A. Thus the issue was joined.
A natural query arises as to the purpose and justification of such legal
fictions. Investigation readily discloses that the real purpose was the means
or method.employed by the judiciary in legalizing that which was demanded
by the nation's growth but which had not yet been sanctioned by the legis-
lature. Some writers justify its use under the "necessity of the nation",
and others because of "public sentiment". Its use has been criticized as
(a) the judicial repeal of a statute or (b) the "ridiculous and absurd fic-
tion" by which a statute was evaded. Despite such just criticism, the justi-
fication for the employment of a fiction was that it became a means of legal
growth apart from direct legislation. Its saving grace was that no one was
in fact ever deceived, nor were fictions intended to deceive. The law, unlike
mathematics, is not an exact science. Habits and thoughts of man con-
stantly vary, and are altered and varied by the changes and evolutions in
government, living conditions, transportation and new concepts in human
relations. The law, of necessity, must follow in the wake of progress.
Yet habits of thought and action insidiously, after time, become fixed and
firm. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to abruptly change or
alter them. In the law we cling to the worn and familiar legal paths.
Ancient markers of bounds and sign posts of direction are not easily up-
rooted. Like the more or less absurd present-day fashion of setting our
watches ahead one hour at a certain season of the year, and turning them
back at another, we have even in modern times set up a sort of non-legal
Aiction as to the correct hour of the day. Nevertheless, for practical pur-
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poses the device seems to add temporarily an additional hour of summer
daylight (to the delight of the golfers and indignation of the farmers)
without seriously disturbing the routine of industry or otherwise adversely
affecting our mental reactions. It would seem that the employment of legal
fictions has very much the same basis of thought. In ancient days a legal
advancement was highly desirable. But there was no adequate legislative
authority immediately available to secure such benefit. The judiciary thus
confronted invented the legal fiction. All the ancient and familiar legal
procedure and principles were retained, but advanced and improved prin-
ciples were beneficially and equitably applied thereunder. There was no
necessity for the destruction, replacement or abandonment of ancient and
familiar principles and procedure.
Examples of legal fictions are numerically abundant and vary in char-
acter and form. No attempt will be made, except by way of illustration,
to trace their origin and operation. Mr. Best in his work on Presumptions,5
following Westenberghis Principia Juris,6 divides fictions into three classes.
Dodderidge, J., in Sheffield v. Radcliff,' says that there are five. But our
own Philadelphia Orphans' Court judge, the Honorable John Marshall
Gest,8 has divided legal fictions into three divisions according to the func-
tions they perform:
(a) Fictions, remnants of realities;
(b) Fictions, explaining inconsistent or refined rules of law;
(c) Fictions, overruling harsh rules of law and establishing
equitable uses in their stead; and this either relating to the
form or procedure by which the law is administered or to
the substance of the law itself.
The last division is by far the most important. The others are largely
but of historical or technical interest.
(a) Remnants of Realities
These may be largely accounted, for in the reflection of past practices
in modern law and procedure. For instance: In indictments for homicide,
until recent years, the instrument of death and its value was found and
presented to the Grand Jury. The reason was that under the old common
law the instrument of death was as Deodand (Deo Dandum) forfeited to
the King ad pios usus. While such law has not continued in England for
nearly two centuries and never obtained in America, yet the remnant of
the law so survived.
IBEsT, PRESUtPTIONS (1844), §24.
Lib. 22, tit. 3, n. 29.
Wrn. Jones 69 (1634).
"Unpublished treatise written for degree of M.A., University of Pennsylvania, April,
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Take the writ of trespass: The words of the old writ were "A B, late
of the County aforesaid was attached to answer C D, of a plea of trespass
on the case". The reference is to the process of attachment by which the
Sheriff was commanded to attach the defendant after his refusal to obey
the verbal admonition of the summoners. The expression "late of the
County" aforesaid refers to the supposed absconding of the defendant from
the Sheriff's bailiwick. 9  Examples could be multiplied. As Judge Gest
observes: Such are not the means of the growth of the law, but rather
evidences of its change. The retention illustrates the conservativeness of
the law which loves to retain all that it is not foriced to part with. But
gradually, in the present modern and utilitarian age, most of those ancient
forms, usages and expressions, have been abolished, as they probably
should be.
(b) Fictions Which Explain Inconsistent or Refined Rules of Law
An excellent illustration of fictions under this classification is apparent
in the doctrine of uses. The Statute of Uses operated to transfer the use
to possession. After the passage of the act it was difficult to determine the
question of seisin to support the uses. As a use could not be limited upon
a use, manifestly the seisin could not vest in the first cestui que use, and
the subsequent uses executed out of his seisin. Another theory that the
seisin was in nubibus or custodio legis ready to serve the uses as they arose,
was likewise untenable. The prevailing doctrine was that a scintilla juris
or possibility of seisin remained in the feoffee to uses to serve the shifting
or contingent uses. Under this doctrine of scintilla juris the uses were
legally supported.
If a citizen plaintiff deserts his case, he is noriuited. Yet if the King
was not present to prosecute his suit, obviously the rights of the lieople,
whom the King represented, ought not to be prejudiced. Therefore, under
the law, in such case, a non-suit could not be entered. To justify the court's
action, the fiction employed was the legal ubiquity of the King The King is
ever in court.
Many of the principles of English land tenure cannot be explained or
understood except upon the fundamental maxim and necessary priniple
"'that the King is the universal lord and original proprietor of all lands in
his kingdom". 0
Thus it was that when occasion arose, the courts invented fictions-
many times ridiculous and logically untenable-to explain or seek t6 justify
the legal principle applicable td a given case.
"3 Bi. CoA. *280.
1"2 id. *5I.
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(c) Fictions Employed to Overrule Harsh Rules of Law
This subdivision probably contains the more important examples of
fictions illustrating judicial advancement of legal progress.
The idea was by no means new even in the early period of English
law. In ancient Rome the praetorian courts overrode legal technicalities
in the application of new ideas through use of the old forms. A vast ma-
jority of the people theretofore deprived of the benefit of the Jus Civile, were
benefited by the action of the judiciary in assumig the existence of condi-
tions necessary under the Jus Civile, whether in truth they did or did not
actually exist."
A large number of fictions were invented whereby the courts assumed
jurisdiction. For example: The jurisdiction of a common law court could
never exteud to a cause of action accruing beyond the limits assigned to the
serving of its writs. Therefore, irrespective of the place, some county in
England was named, which fixed the place of trial. Thus, if a contract
was in fact signed abroad or at sea, the place, by fiction, was a county in
England, or at the Royal Exchange."2
Again: No civil action could be prosecuted in the King's Bench by an
original writ out of Chancery unless the defendant was an officer of the
court or in custody of the Marshal or prison keeper of the court for breach
of peace. When for many historical reasons the time became ripe for
the King's Bench to assume jurisdiction in such case, the jurisdictional
difficulty was overridden by the convenient fiction that the defendant was
actually in custody for breach of the peace.
Akin to fictions of jurisdiction are those by which a remedy is given
for a wrong otherwise without one, or a better remedy is given in place
of one more tedious and antiquated. This may be illustrated by the refer-
ence hereinbefore made to the procedure in the possessory action of eject-
ment-Doe on the demise of Titmouse v. Jolter. This apparently ridiculous
device of employing the mythical Messrs. John Doe and Richard Roe
nevertheless evaded the delay, tediousness and large expense incident to a
real action at common law in the Common Pleas.1
3
In assumpsit perhaps there may be no actual promise to pay. Yet:
"Every man hath engaged to perform what his duty or justice requires".
14
It is upon the legal fiction of an actual promise, however, that assumpsit lies.
In equity jurisdiction there are multitudes of examples of legal fictions.
One of the foundation stones of equity, and perhaps the most important,
is the maxim: "Equity considers that as done which ought to have been
U ADDY, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMONG THE ROMANS (1857) 45.
'See Judge Hare's note to Mostyn v. Fabrigas, I SITH's LEADING CASES (8th Am.
ed., 1885) io46.
' 3 BL. Com. *204; 5 REEVES, HISTORY OF ENSGLIS LAW (i88o) 236-415.
"3 BL. Coi. *162.
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done".'" Thus we have equitable assignments, where in fact no actual
assignment has been made;, also equitable conversion, where real estate is
regarded as personalty, or personalty as realty, where again no actual trans-
fers have occurred.
1 6
In the exercise of a public function, for the benefit of the people as a
whole, it undoubtedly is a wise and sound theory that the rights of one
individual must fall where those of the public are affected. Thus, if one's
house is destroyed to save a serious conflagration, or if a negligently oper-
ated fire engine, patrol or ambulance injures another, there can be Iio re-
covery against the city in damages. 17 The underlying legal reason for the
exemption from liability will be found in the ancient legal maxim that the
King can do no wrong. It was upon such reasoning only that the just and
equitable underlying principles could be so properly applied.
These examples, taken at random, illustrate the object and operation
of. legal fictions. The absurdities and ridiculousness of many of them un-
questionably merit rebuke. Yet as Judge Gest sagely remarks: "Our
English law is not to be blamed so unsparingly for the fictions which it
contains. Fiction considered in its true light is a means of growth, and is
necessary to the development of law in general. It is because some writers
have not regarded it as a means but as something deliberately sought for as
a result, that they have so misinterpreted it."
In the development of the law it is markedly apparent that a fiction
is always supplanted by a better method whenever such becomes available.
In modern times an act of the legislature usually cures the defect and sup-
plants the fiction.
Furthermore, a fictior is limited solely to its end. Fictions are allowed
only in favor of justice and not to defeat it.' 8 When the purpose of a
fiction has been accomplished the rule ceases to operate.' 9
Thus it appears that legal fictions (really judicial legislation) have
always held a prominent position as a formative element in law. Sometimes,
couched in ancient and quaint language, they appear ludicrous and absurd.
Yet they have served, and continue in diminishing numbers to serve, in the
development of the law. To quote the motto on the seal of the Frankford
Historical Society: "That which we now deem ancient was at one time new."
BISPHAM, EQUITY (8th ed., I9og) § 44.
"Id. § 307.
'Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, I13 Pa. 269, 6 At. 536 (1886); 13 P. & L. DIG. CAs., 21764
et seq.
IHarper v. Keely, 17 Pa. 234 (i851).
"Wentz Appeal, 126 Pa. 541, 17 Atl. 875 (i889) ; Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. 391 (1873);
Paul's Estate, supra note I.
